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Abstract
The ad valorem versus unit taxes debate has traditionally
emphasized tax yield. For this criterion, ad valorem taxes
outperform unit taxes in terms of welfare for a wide range of im-
perfect competition settings, including Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic
competition. Yet, in a number of policy ﬁelds, such as environ-
mental, health or trade economics, policy makers apply taxes
to target the production/consumption volume in an industry,
i.e. aim at a certain corrective eﬀect rather than tax yield. This
paper compares the two tax instruments with respect to equal
corrective-eﬀect in a Dixit-Stiglitz setting with love of variety,
entry, exit, and redistribution of tax revenues. We ﬁnd that unit
taxes lead to more ﬁrms in the industry, less output per ﬁrm,
less tax revenue, but higher welfare compared to ad valorem taxes.
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1 Introduction S. Dr¨ oge; P.J.H. Schr¨ oder
1 Introduction
In a number of policy areas policy makers use tax instruments not merely
in pursuit of tax revenue, but also as a means for inﬂuencing the total
production/consumption in an industry. For example, in environmental
policy there exist targets for reductions in pollution, and in order to
achieve these targets corrective taxes are applied to polluting products
(e.g. motor vehicle tax, eco-tax on fuel1). Similarly, in health policy the
proclaimed objective of taxes on, for example, tobacco or alcohol is to
limit the consumption of these noxious products.2 Furthermore, trade
policy can favor domestic producers with market power by limiting the
import volume of foreign competitors through tariﬀs.
In all of these examples the aim of imposing taxes actually is to regu-
late some external eﬀect (pollution, health risk, foreign competition) that
rises proportionally with total industry output, imports or consumption
of these outputs. The generated tax revenues may be welcome – and
indeed as may be the case with taxes on tobacco or alcohol, few govern-
ments could do without them – but tax revenue is not necessarily the
relevant measure, when comparing alternative taxes aiming at correcting
such externalities. Yet, tax revenue is what a large part of existing pub-
lic economics literature focuses on, namely, comparing the eﬀectiveness
and/or welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent taxes with respect to an equal-yield
criterion. The comparison of ad valorem and unit (speciﬁc) taxes is no
exception. Since the writings of Cournot and Wicksell, it is well-known
that the equivalence of unit and ad valorem ﬁscal tools under perfect
competition ceases in monopolistic settings. Suits and Musgrave (1953)
and Delipalla and Keen (1992) provide the tools comparisons under a
wide range of imperfect competitive settings, ﬁnding that ad valorem
taxes outperform unit taxes for the equal tax-yield criterion.3
The present paper reconsiders the welfare comparison of ad valorem
1See e.g. Haughton and Sarkar (1996) for estimates of the corrective-eﬀect of
Gasoline taxes in the US.
2See e.g. the European Charter on Alcohol, 1995, of the World Health Organiza-
tion. http://www.euro.who.int/AboutWHO/Policy. See also O’Donoghue and Rabin
(2003) for a perspective on government policies that correct individual behavior, or
optimal paternalism, in their terminology.
3See also Skeath and Trandel (1994), Myles (1996) or Hamilton (1999) for an equal
yield analysis. Schr¨ oder (2004) provides the equal-yield comparison of ad valorem and
unit taxes under Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition. For a review of the literature
see Keen (1998).
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and unit taxes under monopolistic competition, yet we do not use the
equal tax-yield criterion, but an equal corrective-eﬀect criterion. What is
crucial for this comparison, of course, is that the generated tax revenues
are treated adequately, i.e. that they enter welfare. Furthermore, we
assume that the size of an externality is proportional to total production
of an industry or the total consumption of products from the industry.
Therefore, the tax addresses the industry’s production/consumption. Ac-
cordingly, the analysis must consider both, number and size of individual
ﬁrms. This comprises the entry and exit, and the scale decisions ﬁrms
make after tax interventions. One modelling approach that can capture
these various forces, and the one chosen here, is Dixit-Stiglitz-type mo-
nopolistic competition. The Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) approach towards mo-
nopolistic competition provides a consistent framework where consumers
value product variety and where product diﬀerentiation, economies of
scale and market exit and entry exist. Furthermore, since it is inherently
a general equilibrium approach, the full consequences of redistributing
the revenues that are generated by the two types of taxes – such that
all generated tax-yield re-enters the consumers’ pockets – can be stud-
ied. Firms make zero proﬁts in equilibrium and thus, welfare takes its
starting point in the consumer utility function, which accounts, via the
redistribution of revenues, for the superior yield performance of a tax.
The central ﬁnding of this model is that for an equal externality
correction criterion, unit taxes dominate ad valorem taxes in terms of
welfare. This is the reverse of the usual ﬁnding under the equal-yield
criterion. In particular, we ﬁnd that unit taxes induce more entry of
ﬁrms to the industry, less output per ﬁrm, less tax revenue, but higher
welfare compared to ad valorem taxes.
The present paper relates to the existing literature on corrective taxes.
To the best of our knowledge there is no previous work that provides ad
valorem versus unit tax welfare comparisons for corrective taxes under
monopolistic competition. However, the crucial role of market structure
for the assessment of corrective taxes has already been pointed out by
Buchanan (1969). He demonstrates that the welfare impact of a cor-
rective tax (a unit tax in his case), though positive in the case of a
perfectly competitive industry, may turn out to be negative in case of
taxing a monopoly. More recently Sheshinski (2004) compares corrective
taxes when taxing an externality generating product and taxing house-
holds that are heterogenous in consumption characteristics and when
income redistribution is desirable. Brett and Keen (2000) develop a po-
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litical economy model with corrective taxes where the revenues gener-
ated by those taxes are earmarked. Earlier Dill´ en (1995) has examined
self-ﬁnanced corrective tax-subsidy schemes to correct for the distortions
stemming from imperfect competition itself. Shrestha (2001) studies a
situation where uncertainties as to the cost and beneﬁt of an environmen-
tal policy intervention on some perfect competitive but polluting industry
exist and are correlated. The paper derives tools comparisons for linear
taxes, non linear-taxes (i.e. a tax that mirrors the expected schedule of
the marginal beneﬁt of the environmental policy) and quantitative re-
strictions, and identiﬁes parameter ranges of the correlation for which
the various tools dominate each other.
The regulation of an industry’s total production/consumption in or-
der to tackle an externality may occur in many policy ﬁelds. The analysis
of the present paper attempts to keep a broad perspective by disentan-
gling the tools comparison from its respective setting in environmental,
health or trade economics. Instead we model the externality problem in
general functional form, such that the presence of the externality leads
to a situation where the welfare maximizing choice is some generally de-
ﬁned ceiling on total industry volume. The ad valorem and unit tax
instruments under consideration are then imposed in order to achieve
this welfare maximizing level, based on any conceivable mix of the two
tools. In our model, we ﬁnd that an ad valorem tax will induce some
ﬁrms to exit the industry. On the one hand, this exit reduces the ag-
gregate production/consumption externality, but on the other hand, at
the ﬁrm level, output remains unchanged. In contrast, the unit tax cre-
ates in fact entry into the industry, but per ﬁrm output (and hence the
aggregate externality) decreases. With a unit tax, ﬁrms over-shift the
tax to consumers and create more proﬁts. Then, smaller per-ﬁrm pro-
duction suﬃces to create the break-even point where ﬁrms recover ﬁxed
costs. If now welfare rankings are established, we ﬁnd that unit taxation
dominates. It is the consumers ”love of variety” that drives this result.
Entry of ﬁrms, contrary to exit under the ad valorem tax, increases va-
riety and thus consumers’ welfare. This result is obtained even though
the ad valorem tax yields the larger tax revenue and all tax revenues are
redistributed.4
4The ability to trigger additional entry by unit taxes is also present in the equal-
tax-yield comparison in for example Schr¨ oder (2004), but for the equal-yield compar-
ison this eﬀect does not suﬃce to compensate for the higher eﬃciency of ad valorem
taxes in collecting revenue.
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These results carry some policy implications for policy areas where
corrective taxes are applied to regulate the externality of monopolistic
competitive industries. For example, concerning environmental policy,
the ﬁndings of the paper indicate that environmental regulators should
reconsider their reliance on ad valorem taxes in favor of unit taxes. E.g.
if the registration tax for vehicles is supposed to limit the number of
cars, it would be welfare superior to impose it as a unit tax rather than
an ad valorem tax.5 In the case of taxes on tobacco and alcohol most
European countries use in fact excise (i.e. unit) taxes (Martinez-Serrano
and Patterson, 2003). Thus, this would be in line with the welfare op-
timal corrective tax found in the present paper. Finally in trade policy,
speciﬁc (unit) tariﬀs even though avoided under the majority of WTO
regulation, could be reconsidered on grounds of consumer welfare. In
particular, when converting non-tariﬀ barriers into tariﬀs (tariﬃcation)
the application of speciﬁc tariﬀs may be able to command a welfare gain
compared to the application of ad valorem tariﬀs, while maintaining the
same level of total import volume (for discussions of tariﬃcation in WTO
rounds see e.g. Ingco, 1996; and Nguyen et al., 1993).
The Dixit-Stiglitz type monopolistic competition setting is used by
several other authors for comparisons of ad valorem and unit taxes.
Closely related to the present paper is Schr¨ oder (2004) who compares
ad valorem and unit taxes. Yet, Schr¨ oder (2004) uses the traditional
equal-yield criterion and conﬁrms the welfare superior performance of
ad valorem taxes established for a wide range of imperfect competitive
settings (Delipalla and Keen, 1992). Furthermore, and in contrast to the
present paper, this does only consider either ad valorem or unit taxes
and ignores the possibility of mixing the two tools. Dr¨ oge and Schr¨ oder
(2005) apply a Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model in order to
consider ad valorem and unit taxes in comparison with ad valorem and
unit subsidies in an environmental economics setting. Their measure of
comparison is the share of green produce in total output. They ﬁnd that
when policy makers want to achieve such a ratio target, that the ranking
of instruments depends on the share of polluting output within an indus-
try. For a small share, a unit tax is welfare superior to an ad valorem
tax, but for high market shares of dirty products the ranking turns up-
side down. Other authors that use monopolistic competition settings to
study environmental policy issues and instruments include Heijdra and
5Currently, in 10 out of EU-15 countries the vehicle registration tax is levied as
an ad valorem tax. See Kuhfeld and Kunert (2000).
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van der Ploeg (1995) and Haupt (2000). These papers address optimality
when inducing abatement.
Finally, the superior performance of the unit instrument can be linked
to the results of several other papers that are situated in various imper-
fect competition settings. Pirttil¨ a (2002) shows that a Delipalla and Keen
(1992)-type model, once augmented with a second distortion (apart from
imperfect competition), does generate rankings of unit and ad valorem
taxes that depend on the relative size of the two distorting factors. An-
derson et al. (2001) establish in a love of variety setting diﬀerent from
Dixit-Stiglitz, using a discrete choice framework for consumer demand,
paired with Bertrand competition and diﬀerentiated products that the
welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes can be challenged by a unit tax
once there is free entry and suﬃcient love of variety. Vetter (2001) es-
tablishes that quotas (modelled as a unit tool) are superior to taxes
(modelled as an ad valorem tax), although a ﬁrst best solution can only
be obtain using a mix of both tools. Apart from comparing quotas to
taxes, and being placed in a Dixit-Stiglitz and Spence (1976a,b)-type
framework, the work by Vetter (2001) diﬀers from the present paper by
not considering the redistribution of the revenues generated by the policy
intervention. As discussed above this can be problematic, in particular
since the inferior instrument in the present paper (and in Vetter, 2001),
is the ad valorem tool, which however commands the larger revenue.
Finally, Jørgensen and Schr¨ oder (2005) present an intra-industry trade
model following Krugman (1980), based on Dixit-Stiglitz love of vari-
ety. Comparing either ad valorem or speciﬁc (unit) tariﬀs they establish
that speciﬁc tariﬀs may welfare dominate ad valorem tariﬀs. The work by
Jørgensen and Schr¨ oder (2005) diﬀers from our paper by setting up a two
country model, applying a diﬀerent utility function and not considering
policy mixes of the two instruments.
In the following section we introduce the model. Section 3 shows the
equilibrium number of ﬁrms, total externality, tax revenues and welfare.
Section 4 concludes and discusses policy implications.
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2 The Model
Consider an industry which causes some kind of externality and whose
market conditions are characterized by monopolistic competition.6 The
industry has a large number of potential variants (ﬁrms), N, which enter
symmetrically into demand. The number of variants actually produced
is n < N and is assumed to be large. The output of ﬁrm i is denoted
by xi, and the externality caused by a ﬁrm is given by di = ±xi, where
± ¸ 0 and identical for all ﬁrms. Thus the externality grows proportional
in ﬁrm output volume. All ﬁrms have the same cost structure li(xi) =
(f + ¯xi) where li is labor – the only factor of production –, where f
is the ﬁxed costs of production and ¯ are marginal costs. The economy
wide wage rate is w. The consumer price is given by the inverse demand
function P(xi). Internalization policy uses both, an ad valorem tax ¿ < 1
and a unit tax T expressed in real terms as t = T
w. As in this type of
model, all output is actually consumed and all ﬁrms and all consumers
behave identically, hence output/production taxation is equivalent to
consumption taxation. Under these conditions, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is
¼i = (1 ¡ ¿)P(xi)xi ¡ (f + (¯ + t)xi)w : (1)
Consumers are assumed to be identical, denoting by ci consumption
of good i and by L the labor force assumed to be equal to the number of
consumers, goods market clearing implies xi = Lci.
The model is completed by imposing a consumer utility function. De-
note by D =
P
di the economy wide aggregated externality and by ¯ D
the externality level prevailing in the absence of any corrective policy.
Denote by u a sub-utility function composed from the consumption of an
un-taxed homogeneous good, l (say leisure), and the consumption of dif-




@u > 0 ; @U
@D < 0 ; @u
@x
@x
@D > 0 ; dU
dDjD!0 > 0 and dU
dDjD! ¯ D < 0 :
The latter two total derivatives imply that the shape of the dam-
age function and the way in which it enters utility is such that max-
imisation of (2) with respect to D deﬁnes an optimal externality level
6This section presents a straightforward application of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) to
the problem at hand.
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D¤ 2]0; ¯ D[. Notice that D = ±xn, and hence D¤
± can deﬁne a target
production/consumption volume for the industry, which can be achieved
via ad valorem and unit taxes.














where 0 < µ < 1 represents the taste for variety parameter, 0 < ® < 1
deﬁnes the share of income consumers spend on the diﬀerentiated goods
and l
L is the per capita consumption of the homogeneous good at price
w. Labour market clearing requires
P
li+l = L. In this speciﬁcation the
elasticity of substitution between goods from the two diﬀerent sectors is
1 which is less than the elasticity of substitution between products from
within the diﬀerentiated sector, 1
1¡µ. This implies e.g. that diﬀerent
varieties of a harmful product, say, cigarettes are closer substitutes to
each others than they are to consumption of leisure. Further, maximising
(3), expenditure shares on homogeneous and diﬀerentiated products will
be (1¡®) and ® respectively. Income-expenditure clearing requires wL+
R = wl+
P
pixi, where R are redistributed tax receipts. Hence, the total
expenditure on the homogeneous good, must fulﬁll wl = (1¡®)(wL+R),
i.e. consumption of leisure is aﬀected by policies aimed at the polluting
diﬀerentiated goods sector via redistributed revenue.
3 Results
The inverse demand function for the polluting industry is calculated





¢® ¡ ¸(p1c1 + ¢¢¢ + pici + ¢¢¢ + pncn ¡ ®(wL + R)
¢
. Given
the large number of ﬁrms assumption, ﬁrms do not realise the impact
of their price on overall sales (and on tax revenue). The ﬁrst order con-
ditions are of the form
7This sub-utility and the following solution steps are in fact the utility function
used in Schr¨ oder (2004) who examines the tax yield and welfare consequences of
ad valorem and unit taxes, but does ignore the issue of obtaining certain corrective
production volumes nor does Schr¨ oder (2004) deal with the case were ad valorem and
unit taxes are in place simultaneously.
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¢1¡® assumed to be constant and where ci =
xi
L (from
the goods market clearing condition). Calculating the price elasticity of
demand in absolute terms yields ² = 1
1¡µ.
Equilibrium in the polluting industry is characterized by prices, per
ﬁrm output and the number of ﬁrms. Due to symmetry we can re-
strict our analysis to one variant (ﬁrm), hence, omitting the subscript











Notice that from (5) it follows that the ad valorem tax is shifted




µ , thus unaﬀected by the ad valorem tax. In contrast the unit tax t
is overshifted onto consumers with factor 1=µ.
Entry, Exit and Scale
Equating the proﬁt-maximising price with the price implied by zero prof-
its, p0 =
(f+(¯+t)x)w
(1¡¿)x , gives the scale decision of ﬁrms, i.e. per ﬁrm output
under free entry and exit:
x =
µf
(1 ¡ µ)(¯ + t)
: (6)
Revenues to be redistributed are both the ad valorem tax revenues,
¿pxn, and the revenues from unit taxes, Txn. Total revenues can thus
be written as R = ¿pxn+twxn. With this expression we are now able to
deduce the number of ﬁrms actually producing in equilibrium via market
clearing using the x and p derived above. In particular, expenditure-





(¯ + t)(1 ¡ ¿)
(¯ + t ¡ ®(tµ + t¿ + ¯¿ ¡ t¿µ))
: (7)
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L(® ¡ 1)®(1 ¡ µ)(¯ + t)2





L®2(1 ¡ µ)µ¯(1 ¡ ¿)2
f (¯(1 ¡ ®¿) + t(1 ¡ ®(µ + ¿ ¡ µ¿)))
2 : (9)
By inspection one ﬁnds that dn
d¿ < 0 ; dn
dt > 0. Furthermore, the deriva-
tives dx
d¿ = 0 ; dx
dt < 0 follow by inspection of (6). Hence, one can state:
Proposition 1. An increase in the ad valorem tax, ¿ reduces the number
of ﬁrms in the industry and leaves the per ﬁrm externality level unaﬀected.
An increase in the unit tax t increases the number of ﬁrms in the industry
and reduces the per ﬁrm externality level.
Proposition 1 paints the following picture of the two tax tools. While
the ad valorem tax reduces the number of ﬁrms, it has no eﬀect on the
per ﬁrm quantity produced, and hence on the per ﬁrm externality level.
Accordingly, a reduction in the aggregate damage via the ad valorem tax
is driven by exit from the industry. In contrast, the unit tax reduces per
ﬁrm production (see equation (6)) and hence per ﬁrm externality, while at
the same time the unit tax increases the number of ﬁrms in the industry.
What motivates this entry into the industry? The fulcrum of this result
is the operating surplus of ﬁrms. From (5) it followed that ﬁrms over-
shift the unit tax with factor 1=µ, this over-shift in turn increases the
operating surplus. Under monopolistic competition, ﬁrm entry into the
industry occurs until all ﬁrms just break-even, i.e. are just able to cover
their ﬁxed production cost f. With a larger operating surplus smaller
product runs suﬃce to achieve this break-even point, hence an increase
in the unit tax may in fact generate entry into the industry, while at the
same time reducing the output volume – and thus the externality – of
every single ﬁrm.
Aggregate Externality and Revenues
It is now possible to calculate the total volume of externality, i.e. the
aggregate damage level entering utility (2) and deﬁned by D =
P
d =
n±x. Using (6) and (7) we get:
D =
±L®µ(1 ¡ ¿)
¯(1 ¡ ®¿) + t(1 ¡ ®(µ + ¿ ¡ µ¿))
: (10)
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±L®µ(® ¡ 1)(t + ¯)




±L®µ(1 + ®(µ(¿ ¡ 1) ¡ ¿))(¿ ¡ 1)
(¯(1 ¡ ®¿) + t(1 ¡ ®(µ + ¿ ¡ µ¿)))2 : (12)
By inspection dD
d¿ < 0 ; dD
dt < 0. Notice that even though the number
of ﬁrms increases in t (Proposition 1) the accompanied reduction in per
ﬁrm externality is so large that the unit tax is able to deliver reductions
of total damage. This leads to the following:
Proposition 2. Increasing either the ad valorem tax ¿ or the unit tax t
reduces the total pollution level D.
The damage level in the absence of any corrective tax policy (¿ =
t = 0) is ¯ D = ±L®µ
¯ . Then there exists some ° > 0 such that D = ° ¯ D,
where ° is a simple measure for the damage level. Furthermore there
must exist some °¤ such that °¤ ¯ D = D¤, i.e. denoting the level of
damage that maximizes utility (2) and depends on the degree and way
in which the externality (e.g. environmental damage, health risks, foreign
competition) reduces utility. With this speciﬁcation, after setting (10)
equal to ° ¯ D we can express t as a function of ¿ to get a function of policy




1 ¡ ¿ ¡ °(1 ¡ ®¿)
1 ¡ ®µ ¡ ®(1 ¡ µ)¿
: (13)
The function in (13) depicts combinations of ¿ and t that result in the
same damage level (denoted by °). This is relevant also for the optimal
damage level, °¤ ¯ D = D¤. Thus, as long as we apply (13) – substituting
¿ for t – changes in ¿ represent a change in the policy mix, in particular
switching away from unit over to ad valorem taxes as we increase ¿.
Furthermore, with (13) we can also explore policy mixes with subsidies.
On the contrary from (13) it follows that for a very tough ad valorem
tax, ¿ ! 1, the unit tax must turn into a subsidy t < 0, to maintain a
certain level of damage, notice that once ° – and therewith the damage
level D – becomes very small, the unit tax will still be positive also for
¿ close to one.
With the iso-damage level relation given in (13) we can now calculate
total revenue from the corrective policy and how revenues react to a
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shift in the policy mix, while maintaining a certain aggregate externality
level.8 Calculating R = ¿pxn + twxn when using the p, x and n derived
above and expressing t in terms of ¿ from (13) we get:
¯ R =
Lw®(¿ + µ(1 ¡ ° ¡ ¿))
1 ¡ ®(µ ¡ (1 ¡ µ)¿)
: (14)




Lw®(1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ®°µ)
(1 ¡ ®(µ(1 ¡ ¿) + ¿))2 ; (15)
which by inspection yields d ¯ R
d¿ > 0. We arrive at the following result for
the revenue eﬃciency of the two types of taxes:
Proposition 3. For any given level of corrective-eﬀect – including the
optimal level of aggregate externality D¤ – the substitution of ad valorem
taxes, ¿, for unit taxes, t, in the policy mix, raises total revenues.
Proposition 3 says that the ad valorem tax is superior in raising rev-
enues compared to the unit tax. This result is in fact a common ﬁnding
in public economics where ad valorem tax tools are usually superior in
extracting proﬁts from imperfect competitive markets – when compared
to speciﬁc tools such as the unit tax modelled here; e.g. Delipalla and
Keen (1992), Schr¨ oder (2004). The ad valorem tax performs better with
respect to revenues because it does not induce an over-shift and hence
is also more eﬃcient in addressing the externality problem compared to
the unit tax which leads to an over-shift 1=µ, see (5).
Welfare
Proposition 1 and 3 comprise the fundamental conﬂict between the two
types of taxes: ad valorem and unit. While the unit tax appears to
be superior in terms of maintaining higher entry into the sector, which
should increase consumer welfare, the ad valorem tax ensures a higher
level of revenues which, since all revenues are redistributed to consumers,
has a positive impact on welfare. Hence, we have two opposing eﬀects.
8It is obvious that when not keeping the externality level constant an increase in
either policy tool leads to an increase of revenues and a reduction in the aggregate
externality.
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To obtain a comprehensive ranking of the two taxes, and thus an
evaluation of the two opposing eﬀects, we must calculate total welfare.
Due to entry and exit, proﬁts are zero and since all revenues are re-
distributed to the population, total consumer utility is a measure of
welfare. Utility, U, (2) depends only on D and sub-utility, u and we
only consider situations with constant damage D – including the opti-
mal damage level D¤. Therefore, a ranking of the sub-utility levels also
implies a ranking of overall utility and hence a welfare ranking. Total







nxµ¢®, which after setting in the x and n
from above and the t and ¯ R given in (13) and (14), respectively, becomes:
¯ W =
µ
L (¡1 + ®) (¡1 + ®° µ)



















The expression denotes total consumer sub-utility for constant levels of
damage, as depicted by °, thus applies also to the optimal damage level.
Diﬀerentiating (16) with respect to ¿, the following welfare ranking of
the two tax tools is obtained.
Proposition 4. For any given level of a corrective-eﬀect – including the
optimal level of aggregate externality D¤ – the substitution of unit taxes,
t, for ad valorem taxes, ¿, increases total welfare.
Proposition 4 establishes, that unit taxes are welfare superior com-
pared to ad valorem taxes. The derivative of ¯ W is given in the appendix.
This welfare ranking applies across the entire parameter range, for any
mix of policy, and for any mix of industries, ®. Moreover, it is indepen-
dent of the degree to which the externality enters utility – which in fact
depends on the action taken by policy makers –, and the degree of prod-
uct diﬀerentiation, µ. This result is obtained even though the ad valorem
tax raises more revenues then the unit tax, and it is derived for a fairly
general speciﬁcation of how damage inﬂuences utility. The driver for the
welfare superior performance of the unit tax is the entry/exit behavior of
ﬁrms in the industry. The unit tax directly enters ﬁrms marginal costs
and thus reduces their individual output and externality volume. Yet,
by increasing the ﬁrms’ operating surplus, entry into the industry is se-
cured, and this obtains a given level of total externality with a larger
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number of ﬁrms (each producing relatively less externalities compared to
the ad valorem tax case). It is the larger number of ﬁrms that exists in
the sector under the unit tax that results in the higher welfare.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we compare the performance of corrective ad valorem and
unit taxes with respect to the eﬃciency in cutting an external eﬀect under
imperfect competition, in particular cutting externalities by taxing the
associated industries output or the consumption of this output. In a
Dixit-Stiglitz-type monopolistic competition setting, solved in general
equilibrium with full redistribution of all tax revenues, we establish an
analytical welfare ranking of the two tax instruments for an equal but
generally formulated corrective eﬀect, thus abandoning the traditional
equal tax-yield criterion usually applied in tools comparisons.
The central ﬁndings are that unit taxation generates more entry into
the industry than ad valorem taxation, i.e. more ﬁrms enter and, given
the consumers taste for variety, this should increase welfare. However,
each ﬁrm operates at a lower scale when subject to unit taxation as
compared to a situation with ad valorem taxation. More importantly, ad
valorem taxation leads to larger tax revenues, i.e. extracting more proﬁts
from the industry in question. Since tax revenues are redistributed, this
has a positive impact on consumer welfare. These various forces lead to
a welfare ranking in which unit taxes turn out to dominate ad valorem
taxes. This is in disaccord with the traditional ﬁndings made in a wide
range of imperfect competitive settings for an equal tax yield target.
Thus, for the equal corrective eﬀect criterion, the present paper shows
that unit taxes might challenge the usual dominance of ad valorem taxes.
The major force behind this ﬁnding is the entry or exit of ﬁrms associated
with ﬁrms’ diﬀerent shifting of the tax burden of the two tax instruments:
A unit tax leads to a more than proportional increase in prices and this
entails higher proﬁts, which in turn are competed away by entry of new
ﬁrms. The speciﬁcation of monopolistic competition, in which consumers
favor variety and where each new ﬁrm oﬀers a new variant, then produces
higher consumer utility. While this additional welfare from extra varieties
is insuﬃcient to reverse the ranking of the two tax instruments for the
equal yield criterion, it suﬃces once we compare the tools along their
ability to implement a corrective eﬀect on industry volume, and thus
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some proportionally associated externality.
Our ﬁndings are relevant for a number of policy areas such as environ-
mental, health or trade policy. Whenever ad valorem tools are imposed
as corrective instruments, and not with the predominant purpose of gen-
erating tax revenues, the choice of the tax tool should be reconsidered
depending on the mode of competition in the industry in question. How-
ever, the analysis made represents only a ﬁrst step towards a broader
approach for tool comparisons. Every state intervention provokes ﬁrms
and consumers to reconsider their technological equipment and consump-
tion habits, respectively. This issue is widely discussed in the application
to environmental economics. If, e.g. the externality that motivates a
tax is air pollution, ﬁrms can either abate more (and thus improve the
output-externality performance), pay, or exit. The present paper ignores
the ﬁrst option but addresses the other two. Moreover, the technologi-
cal choice of ﬁrms may also be relevant for health or trade protection.
However, health risks caused by alcohol or tobacco consumption are un-
likely to be cured via technological improvement on the production side,
thus in this sectors ﬁrms can only improve on general production costs,
while on the consumption side a tax intervention may induce a switch
to alternative and potentially more harmful substances. Furthermore,
concerning trade policies aiming at the reduction of total import volume,
our ﬁndings suggest that this is best achieved via speciﬁc tariﬀs. Yet,
speciﬁc tariﬀs come at great administrative cost compared to ad valorem
tariﬀs, which is another issue left for future research.
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Appendix
Derivative of ¯ W










f ° µ (1¡® µ+® (¡1+µ) ¿)




L (¡1 + ®° µ) (¡1 + ¿)
:(17)
The denominator is always positive, while (¡1 + µ) generates a neg-
ative sign in the numerator. The expression (1 ¡ ®µ + ®(¡1 + µ)¿) can
be re-written as (1 ¡ ®(µ + (1 ¡ µ)¿)) which is always positive, since
(µ + (1 ¡ µ)¿) < 1.
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